「指物」與「齊物」的認知觀點比較/Comparison of the Cognitive Perspective of “Referring to Things” and “Equality of Things”
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| Title | 「指物」與「齊物」的認知觀點比較/Comparison of the Cognitive Perspective of “Referring to Things” and “Equality of Things” |
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| Abstract | 摘要「指物」是名家公孫龍的觀點，「齊物」是道家莊子的看法。莊子在〈齊物論〉中強烈批評公孫龍的「指物」思想。公孫龍的〈指物論〉基本上是主客二元認知模式，而莊子〈齊物論〉的認知觀點則是「道通為一」的感通模式。本文從認知的目的、方式、結果等方面進行比較；說明「指物」的認知觀點容易走入懷疑或不可知論，而莊子的「齊物」觀點，雖有神秘色彩，但在認知方法上，提供了階段性的「整體把握」。「指物」與「齊物」的認知觀點，在傳統中國哲學認知問題上具有相輔相成的意義。關鍵詞：指物、齊物、主客二元、道通為一AbstractWhile Gong Sun Longzi advocated the cognitive perspective of “referring to things”, (zhi wu 指物) Zhuangzi advocated the cognitive position of “equality of things” (qi wu 齊物), which strongly criticized the former. The cognitive model of Gong Sun Longzi is basically a subject-object dualism, but Zhuangzi’s cognitive perspective is that all things are penetrated into One by Dao. The purpose of this article is to compare the cognitive purpose, methods, and results between Gong Sun Longzi and Zhuangzi and to illustrate that the cognitive perspective of “referring to things” may easily fall into scepticism, or agnosticism, and Zhuang zi’s “equality of things” point of view is, although mysterious, a cognitive approach, providing a stage for “overall grasp”. Both of them have complementary significance of the cognitive problems in the traditional Chinese philosophy.Keywords: referring to things, equality of things, subject-object dualism, Dao tong wei yi |
| Publisher | Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana/Znanstvena založba FF |
| Date | 2012-09-25 |
| Source | Azijske in afriške študije Vol 16, No 1 (2012): Recent Contributions from Taiwanese Academic Circles: Methodology, Philosophy, |